Pacu 🧉 at ZODL (he/him) 🦓 @thecodebuffet

@tonymargarit @BostonZcash Glad to be on your team Tony. 💪

To get ahead of scams, if you're interested in donating to me for finding the Zcash bug, my addresses are in this post or in my replies below (be careful to check the exact username for lookalike scammers). Nothing else has been approved by me. Note: I intend to apply for a bounty through a Zcash coinholder grant, so donations are much appreciated but not necessary! Zcash: u1k6y9wpyc5m5ec3wz49ny9chewklyexn8rdj7928n3zswh0gwl0gh3zwwg37p76j7vrrv8s0dj8rhjfc49pg9yv9mjdea2sn86tnjh99a9424cdvw3aadyz8v40ddancr7e4kjzw07qhrcdez3d9sycx89f87vjw7eaxys2aktsm57tkp t1eykDAemzff7oPAA2E43Z47iawATB4bZRy Solana: D6c34hRcmhkHMXaAhoPXgVw9JYrh84saeSfYnk7ZSjeW ETH: 0x1b8203102aE3469a67E78FF9a78d8A5cC7E7e769 BTC: bc1qtxqv8fzj2pnewj2y5l8nh4ur4rkrvm2kv6mlp9

@mrkit2u A remark. The block explorer downtime was due to the secrecy that was needed to make the whole procedure leading to the hard fork. Other NUs had near to zero downtime. I can’t disclose the detail of the procedure. This time only a handful of people knew about the whole thing

It's still Zcash or communism.

just woke up and seeing a fair bit of fake info - first, there is no *known* exploit. the possibility of a bug has always existed, so there is no new information. what's happened is a highly advanced zcash expert spent a lot of resources trying to find bugs and *patched* one. that's all the information that's new: that a bug was patched. - again, all signs show no exploit but you can not 100% guarantee this until the next network upgrade, which core devs are working on right now. Eta soon. - you can NOT have infinite total ZEC supply EVEN if this bug was exploited. What would instead happen is that the single orchard pool would be insolvent assuming no social recovery. Now for all purposes, that would still be catastrophic but very different than people implying you can just bridge out infinite amounts (you cant) So tl dr - you cant have infinite supply bridging out, that's not possible. you CAN have a case where ppl in the shielded pool get insolvent if and only if the bug was exploited. my money is on the bug not being exploited but to prove this for everyone, the next upgrade will help you verify it yourself

Arjun Khemani @arjunkhemani

17 hours ago

Devs are actively building a formally verified shielded pool. Migrating to it would lock in the 21 million ZEC supply cap and provide cryptographic assurance that this bug was never exploited.

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Zcash is strong and will get through this. The bug was found, disclosed, and fixed. There is no evidence it was exploited. It was discovered by a white-hat researcher whose job was to find vulnerabilities before attackers could. That's exactly how security should work. Over time, users can migrate to newer shielded pools that benefit from years of research, real-world experience, and lessons learned. Tachyon is expected to be the safest yet. The bigger lesson is that, in the age of AI, every protocol should be relentlessly battle-tested. We now have tools that can analyze code and cryptographic systems at a scale that wasn't possible before. Projects should use them aggressively to find weaknesses before attackers do. Finding a bug isn't a sign that security has failed. Not looking for bugs is.

zooko🛡🦓🦓🦓 ⓩ @zooko

a day ago

x.com/i/article/2062…

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@santisiri En mi opinión, “It was just found” es un poco mucho. Taylor Hornsby es uno de los mejores auditores del mundo que más conoce este tipo de pruebas Zk.

There will be bugs. Pretending otherwise, is delusional. Software security at its core is a never-ending race between the good guys and the bad guys. The good guys always have to stay at least one step ahead of the bad guys. AI doesn't change this game of cat and mouse, it just accelerates it. Every piece of software has to run this race. There's no escaping it and there's no better team in the world to run this race than the team working on Zcash. Onward.

Cameron Winklevoss @cameron

a day ago

Zcash has unparalleled cryptographers, security engineers, and security researchers. And the community is heavily focused on continuous improvement and hardening the network. That's why it engages world class security researchers to look for bugs. And that's why the recent

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In the last 48 hours, amid all the FUD, the size of the Zcash shielded pool has dropped from 31% of supply to 30%. Down ~1%.

We can formally verify Zcash's shielded protocol so that the concern you're worried about -- the unique class of supply integrity vulnerabilities -- is actually *impossible.* (It mathematically reduces directly to the cryptographic assumptions.) It's something we can probably do within weeks for our *existing* protocol, because the theorems are very simple and the proofs don't have to be written or checked by humans anymore... I think this more than satisfies the concern. I've actually been talking about this for Zcash for a long time now! I've been blogging about it for nearly a year, we hired experts 6 months ago to help us formally verify our upcoming Zcash upgrade, it was the main focus of a post of mine last month... It's just that nobody really gives a shit about high assurance cryptography until there's a bug. tachyon.z.cash/blog/folding-t…

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Zcash has unparalleled cryptographers, security engineers, and security researchers. And the community is heavily focused on continuous improvement and hardening the network. That's why it engages world class security researchers to look for bugs. And that's why the recent potential exploit was found. It wasn't by accident and it's a vote of confidence, not a cause for alarm. When it comes to any L1, there will be bugs. What's important is that there are world class researchers focused on hardening the network and staying ahead of the bad guys. This has always been and always will be the dynamic of building software that is secure. Onward.

yes bugs exist in software, I recall BTC having several colossal ones including BTC supply going to 184 billion coins vs 21m the reality is that outside of self-custodying a transparent asset on an L1 without using any smart contracts (where the ultimate defense would be a rollback or split), there is always a risk of bugs in crypto. the only difference in privacy is that privacy makes it harder to detect timely (though defi hackers move funds super fast to get away anyway as we saw at least 10 times this year so in practice it ends the same) that is not a reason to write crypto to zero but to keep strengthening it with things like formal verification and provable soundness. otherwise there's no point to the industry. the facts right now are that the bug was patched and there's no known exploit. to your point, won't be able to prove this until the next upgrade, but it's coming soon there is just no point in crypto if we're not trying to improve the software custodying funds and so we will make it work because we must

Zodl swaps are back up. Thanks to the @near_intents team for their work restoring service following the network upgrade.

Zcash unambiguously has the best security response in the world, thanks to @zodl_co and @ZcashFoundation engineers.

Public Service Announcement 📢 Several Zcash wallets and services are in the process of updating to support NU6.2. Look out for new versions or restore from seed phrase and resync using Zodl wallet 📥

Status update on swaps:

Zodl Support @zodl_support

a day ago

@xGreyces @yxNomad @7Sent_ @Hiatus_One @zodl_co @zodl_app @NEARProtocol @near_intents @AlexAuroraDev NEAR is currently working on final tasks in preparation to unpause ZEC swaps. We'll inform as soon as Swaps & CrossPay are live again in @zodl_app. In the interim, you'll see 'Quote Unavailable' if attempting to swap. You may also monitor NEAR's status and subscribe for updates

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Here are some counterpoints: 1. Coordination capacity isn't the same as control. If ZODL's intentions were bad, they couldn't have shipped this unilaterally. The Zcash Foundation maintains Zebra, an entirely separate node implementation, and any malicious patch would have required ZF, Shielded Labs, ECC, miners, and exchanges to all collude. The capacity that made this response possible is the same capacity you want in any network facing a soundness bug. Bitcoin has it (used it for CVE-2018-17144). 2. Public discourse before patch deployment hands the attacker the bug spec while the window is still open. This is the standard responsible-disclosure pattern for every protocol-level security issue: Bitcoin (CVE-2018-17144), Ethereum, Monero, all have the same playbook. 3. A rational exploiter would have extracted aggressively before disclosure: both because the patch window is the only realization window, and because they'd fear another exploiter beating them to it. We'd see the pattern in unshielding flows. We don't. Turnstiles is also consensus code that's been live since 2018, audited extensively, in completely different code paths. It's very unlikely to contain bugs.

Update: core Zodl wallet functionality has been restored. ✅ Send ZEC ✅ Receive ZEC ✅ Shield funds ✅ Keystone support We’re still confirming the status of: • Swaps (via NEAR) • Flexa payments We’ll share additional updates as they become available. Thanks for your patience while services come back online after the Zcash network update.

@mert freerogernow.org/roman-storm#do… Has unified zcash address